This paper studies random-matching economies where …at money coexists with a real asset, and no restrictions are imposed on payment arrangements. The real asset is partially illiquid due to informational asymmetries about its fundamental value. The extent to which the real asset is used as means of payment depends on the variance of its dividend as well as monetary policy. The e¤ects of in ‡ation on payment arrangements, asset prices, and welfare are analyzed.
Introduction
The recognition that some assets have a special role in facilitating trades has major implications for macroeconomics. 1 As shown by Marshall (1992) , Bansal and Coleman (1996) , Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) and Lagos (2006) , among others, it helps understand asset pricing anomalies and the transmission of monetary policy to assets'returns. A common approach, however, is to take as exogenous the ease with which assets are traded. This type of shortcuts is undesirable as it occults the link between the liquidity of an asset and its intrinsic characteristics and it makes the model ill-equipped for policy analysis-e.g., the degree of moneyness of an asset is likely to depend on the stance of monetary policy. 2 The aim of this paper is to provide a monetary theory of asset liquidity-one that emphasizes the role of assets in payment arrangements-and to explore its implications for the relationship between assets'intrinsic characteristics and liquidity and the e¤ects of monetary policy on payment arrangements, asset prices, and welfare. Following the tradition pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) , this paper considers economies where some trades occur within bilateral meetings and a double-coincidence-of-wants problem makes the use of a medium of exchange necessary. Fiat money coexists with a real asset, and no restrictions are imposed on payment arrangements.
The main innovation consists in endogenizing the liquidity of the real asset, as apprehended by its transaction velocity, by introducing an informational asymmetry in regard to the fundamental value of the asset. Speci…cally, some agents are better informed about the future performance of the real asset, which makes it costly to trade.
A novel aspect of the theory is that it generates a strict preference for currency as a means of payment.
In some states, individuals …nance their consumption opportunities with cash and use their real assets as means of payment only if their currency holdings are depleted. Moreover, individuals do not spend their marginal unit of the real asset even when their consumption is ine¢ ciently low. As a consequence of the illiquidity of the real asset, a monetary equilibrium exists-one where …at money is valued-irrespective of the quantity of the real asset, provided that in ‡ation is not too high. 1 Assets can facilitate trades in various ways: by acting as means of payment (e.g., currency and demand deposits), by being easily transformed into means of payment (e.g., checkable mutual funds), or by serving as collateral (e.g., government securities, land). 2 According to the Wallace (1996) dictum, the roles of assets as means of payment should not be taken as a primitive but it should be explained by the frictions in the environment and assets'physical properties. This paper will make an attempt to comply with this dictum.
A major insight of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) was to show that the acceptability of a good depends on its its storage cost as well as other fundamentals (e.g., the pattern of specialization) and beliefs. In the same spirit, this paper establishes a relationship between asset liquidity and its dividend process. The asset becomes less liquid as the dispersion of the dividends across states increases. Moreover, if the real asset is valueless in some states then it becomes fully illiquid and …at money is the only means of payment.
A long lasting challenge of monetary theory-the central issue of the pure theory of money, according to Hicks (1935) -is to explain why …at money is held when there are capital goods with a higher rate of return. As noticed by Mehra and Prescott (1985) , this rate-of-return dominance puzzle echoes the equity premium puzzle-the excessively large di¤erence between the rate of return of equity and risk-free government liabilities. In the model presented in this paper, individuals exhibit a strict preference for currency which manifests itself by a rate-of-return di¤erential between …at money (which can readily be reinterpreted as a risk-free bond) and the real asset. The illiquidity premium paid to the real asset emerges even though agents are risk-neutral with respect to their consumption of the dividend good, and it tends to increase as the asset becomes riskier and more abundant.
Arguably, the environment in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) is stark, and hardly amenable to policy analysis. This paper borrows some innovations from recent monetary theory to allow for money growth and in ‡ation while keeping the model tractable. As a consequence, the model delivers insights for the linkages between monetary policy and asset prices. Monetary policy a¤ects an asset's return when the quantity of the real asset is not too large and in ‡ation is in some intermediate range. An increase in in ‡ation induces a reallocation of individuals' portfolios towards the real asset. Consequently, the model predicts a negative relationship between in ‡ation and assets'expected returns. The optimal monetary policy is such that the real asset is illiquid: its transaction velocity (in some states) and liquidity premium are zero.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 provides a review of the relevant literature. The environment is described in Section 2 and the social optimum is characterized in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the bargaining game under incomplete information and solves for the allocations in the nonmonetary economy.
Sections 5 and 6 consider two versions of the model corresponding to di¤erent interpretations of the real asset and the way it is traded. In the …rst version, the real asset, interpreted as private equity, can only be traded over the counter, in bilateral meetings. In the second version, the real asset viewed as a publicly traded stock can be priced both in centralized and decentralized markets. explain Gresham's law with an adverse selection problem in a search environment with a …xed supply of indivisible coins of di¤erent qualities. 7 I follow Wallace's (1996) dictum and make no restrictions on the use of assets as means of payment.
In the same vein, Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright (1996) , Wallace (1996 Wallace ( , 2000 and Cone (2005) emphasize asset divisibility, or lack of divisibility, to explain the coexistence of money and interest-bearing assets and the liquidity structure of asset yields. In contrast to Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright (1996) , Shi (2004) and Zhu and Wallace (2007) , this paper is not an attempt to explain the coexistence of …at money and risk-free government bonds. (One could substitute currency by risk-free bonds, like in Lagos (2006) .)
Finally, Lagos and Rocheteau (2006) and Geromichalos, Licari and Suarez-Lledo (2007) study a complete information version of the model in this paper. Money is useful provided that the capital stock in the economy is small, and if money and capital coexist they have the same rate of return. In contrast, in my model the presence of money is always useful irrespective of the size of the capital stock, and if money and capital coexist then capital dominates money in its rate of return.
Environment
Time is discrete, starts at t = 0, and continues forever. Each period has two subperiods, a morning (AM) followed by an afternoon (PM), where di¤erent activities take place. There is a continuum of agents divided into two types, called buyers and sellers, who di¤er in terms of when they produce and consume. The labels buyers and sellers indicate agents'roles in the PM market. There are two consumption goods, one produced in the AM and the other in the PM. Consumption goods are perishable.
Agents live for three subperiods. Buyers and sellers from generation t are born at the beginning of period t, and they die at the end of the AM in period t + 1. (See Figure 1. ) Let B t denote the set of buyers from generation t, S t the set of sellers from generation t, and J t = B t [ S t . 8 The measures of buyers and sellers are normalized to 1.
Buyers produce in the …rst AM of their lives while sellers produce in the PM. This heterogeneity will divisible money. The "counterfeit" consumption good is perishable, it has no value, and only a pooling mechanism is considered. 7 Li (1995) constructs a related model, in which there is quality uncertainty about commodity monies. 8 This overlapping-generations structure facilitates the presentation of the model. For a related environment, see Zhu (2006) and Zhu and Wallace (2007) . The assumption of alternating market structures is borrowed from Lagos and Wright (2005 generate a temporal double-coincidence problem. 9 The utility of a buyer born at date t is
where x t is the AM consumption of period t,`t is the AM disutility of work, q t is the PM consumption, and 2 (0; 1) is a discount factor. The utility function u(q) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, u(0) = 0,
, and u 00 (q) < 0. The production technology in the AM is linear with labor as the only input, y t =`t. Buyers'endowment of labor is unlimited when young.
The utility of a seller born at date t is
where q t is the PM production. The cost function c(q) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, c(0) = c 0 (0) = 0, c 0 (q) > 0, c 00 (q) 0 and c(q) = u(q) for some q > 0. Let q denote the solution to u 0 (q ) = c 0 (q ).
At the beginning of his life, each buyer is endowed with A > 0 units of a one-period-lived real asset. The asset is perfectly divisible, uncounterfeitable, and perfectly durable over its lifetime. Each unit of the asset held by buyer j 2 B t yields j;t+1 units of AM-output delivered in t+1, and it fully depreciates subsequently.
The real dividend can take two values, j;t+1 2 f `; h g, where 0 < `< h . Let B h t fj 2 B t : j;t+1 = h g denote the subset of buyers from generation t endowed with high-dividend assets, and Bt B t nB h t the subset of buyers endowed with low-dividend assets.
I will consider two versions of the model, which di¤er in terms of the description of the dividend shock . In the …rst version, the j;t 's are the realizations of i. In the AM, there is a competitive market where agents can trade goods and …at money. I will make di¤erent assumptions about whether the real asset can be traded or not in the AM. No other assets (such as bonds) are available in this market.
In the PM, each seller is matched bilaterally with a buyer drawn at random from B t . 11 All trades in the PM are quid pro quo, and matched agents can transfer any nonnegative quantity of PM-output and any quantity of their asset holdings. Agents can only trade the physical asset and not claims on future output.
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In order to guarantee that there is an essential role for a medium of exchange, there is no public record of individuals'trading histories. 13 Terms of trade in the PM are determined according to a simple bargaining game: The buyer makes an o¤er that the seller accepts or rejects. If the o¤er is accepted then the trade is implemented. At the end of the PM, agent pairs split apart.
Social optimum
Consider the problem of a social planner who chooses an allocation in order to maximize the sum of utilities of all agents in the economy. The planner assigns the Pareto-weights t to all agents from generation t, i.e., it values equally the consumption of one unit of AM-good and the disutility cost to produce one such unit by any agent alive in period t.
14 Let M t B t S t denote the set of bilateral matches composed of one buyer and one seller in the PM of period t. The expression for social welfare is then
The …rst integral on the right-hand side of (3) corresponds to the AM-consumption of all old agents from t = 1 onwards. The second term is the AM disutility of production of the young buyers from t = 0 onwards.
The last term is buyers'consumption net of sellers'disutility of production in bilateral matches formed in the PM subperiods.
The planner observes the realizations of the dividend shocks f j;t g at the beginning of period t. It is subject to the following feasibility constraints:
Feasibility constraint (4) requires agents'AM-consumption in period t to be at most equal to the aggregate production in that period, including the output generated by the stock of assets, A. Feasibility condition (5) indicates that the buyer's consumption in a bilateral match is no greater than the seller's production in that match.
The planner's problem can be rewritten as a sequence of static problems, i.e., max xt;`t;qt
subject to (4) and (5) . The planner is indi¤erent on how to allocate the AM-goods between agents. The optimal consumption and production in bilateral matches satisfy q t (j) = q t (j 0 ) = q for all (j; j 0 ) 2 M t .
Payments under private information
In this section, I consider an economy without …at money, where only real assets can be used as media of exchange. There is no market in the AM: all trades occur in bilateral meetings in the PM. This version of the model is consistent with the dividend shock being idiosyncratic or aggregate.
This section has two purposes. One is to investigate how private information a¤ects the capacity of an asset to serve as a means of payment, thereby providing a benchmark to compare with the monetary economies studied later. The second purpose is to analyze in detail the bargaining game under incomplete information in a simple environment.
The bargaining game between a buyer and a seller in the PM has the structure of a signaling game. 15 An equilibrium of the bargaining game is a pro…le of strategies for the buyer and the seller, and a belief system . The equilibrium concept is sequential equilibrium. The buyer chooses an o¤er that maximizes his surplus, taking as given the acceptance rule of the seller. The seller chooses optimally to reject or accept o¤ers given his posterior belief. If (q; p) corresponds to an equilibrium o¤er, then (q; p) is derived from the seller's prior belief according to Bayes's rule. If (q; p) is an out-of-equilibrium o¤er, then the seller's belief is arbitrary (to some extent discussed later).
For a given belief system, the set of acceptable o¤ers for a seller is
For an o¤er to be acceptable, the seller's disutility of production in the PM, c(q), must be compensated by his expected discounted utility in the next AM, E [ ] d, where the expectation is with respect to the random dividend of the asset. I assume that a seller agrees to any o¤er that makes him indi¤erent between 1 5 See Appendix B for a more detailed presentation of signaling games. If one rescales the buyer's payo¤ as u(q)= d and the seller's payo¤ as c(q)= + d, then the bargaining game has the basic take-it-or-leave-it set-up de…ned in Kreps and Sobel (1994, p. 855) . accepting or rejecting a trade.
Sellers'beliefs following out-of-equilibrium o¤ers are largely arbitrary. The equilibrium concept is re…ned by using the Intuitive Criterion proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987) . 17 
According to (9) , the unsent o¤er (q;d) would make an h type buyer strictly better o¤ if it were accepted.
According to (10) , the unsent o¤er (q;d) would make an` type buyer strictly worse o¤. According to (11) , the o¤er is acceptable provided that the seller believes it comes from an h type.
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I next turn to the de…nition of an equilibrium. Time is not introduced explicitly in the de…nition since there is no state variable linking the di¤erent generations. Moreover, the seller's acceptance rule is not included; it appears as a constraint in the buyer's problem.
De…nition 1 An equilibrium is a list of strategies for buyers and a belief system for sellers, Buyers of the same type are allowed to use di¤erent (pure) strategies. All sellers are assumed to use the same belief system , and hence the same acceptance rule. An equilibrium o¤er (q; d) is de…ned as pooling if it is in the support of the distribution of o¤ers made by both h type and` type buyers, i.e., (q; d) 2 (0; 1). 1 6 A similar tie-breaking assumption is used in Rubinstein (1985, Assumption B-3). 1 7 The Intuitive Criterion is a re…nement supported by much of the signalling literature. An equilibrium that fails the Intuitive Criterion gives an outcome that is not strategically stable in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986 Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006) . For sake of completeness, the model is also analyzed under the alternative re…nement from Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993) in Appendix C. 1 8 The inequality in (11) is weak as a result of the tie-breaking rule (7) according to which sellers accept o¤ers that make them indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, there is no pooling o¤ er.
The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates the argument in the proof of Lemma 1. Consider an equilibrium with a pooling o¤er ( q; d). The surpluses of the two types of buyers at the proposed equilibrium are denoted Figure 2 represent the set of o¤ers (q; d) that generate the equilibrium surpluses. They exhibit a single-crossing property, which is key to obtain a separating equilibrium. 19 The participation constraint of a seller who believes he is facing an h type buyer is represented by the frontier U ). These o¤ers satisfy (9)- (11) so that the proposed equilibrium with a pooling o¤er ( q; d) violates the Intuitive Criterion. In order to separate himself, an h type buyer reduces his PM consumption as well as his transfer of his asset to the seller. Provided that the reduction in q is su¢ ciently large relative to the reduction in d, an` type buyer would never choose such an o¤er because his asset is less valuable than the one of an h type buyer.
Pooling equilibrium Separating equilibrium
Offers violating the Intuitive Criterion
Offers attributed to L-type buyers Figure 2 : Pooling vs separating equilibria 1 9 For a de…nition of the single-crossing property, see Kreps and Sobel (1994, p. 855) . The slopes of the indi¤erence curves
I now characterize the equilibrium o¤ers. The only way an` type buyer can achieve a higher payo¤ than the one he would get in a game with complete information is by making an o¤er that a seller would attribute to an h type buyer with positive probability, i.e., (q; d) > 0, which has been ruled out by Lemma 1. Hence, since the complete information payo¤ can always been achieved, i.e., (q; d) 0, the o¤er of aǹ type buyer solves 
From (13)- (14) the buyer maximizes his expected surplus subject to the participation constraint of the seller, where the seller has the correct belief that he faces an h type buyer, and subject to the incentivecompatibility condition according to which an` type buyer cannot be made better-o¤ by o¤ering (q h ; d h ).
20
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium (up to the belief system ), and it is such that` type buyers trade
Furthermore, d h < d`and q h < q` q .
2 0 Suppose there is a separating equilibrium where the expected payo¤ of the` type is U ( `) and the expected payo¤ of the (14) by U ( `) " with " > 0, and denote U " ( h ) the associated payo¤ for the h type buyer. The set of acceptable and feasible o¤ers is compact. From the Theorem of the Maximum,
The associated o¤er satis…es (9)- (11) so that the proposed equilibrium violates the Intuitive Criterion.
If the quantity of asset is large enough, then the trade in` type matches is e¢ cient, q = q . In contrast, if the value of the asset is less than the disutility incurred by the seller to produce q , then the` type buyer cannot ask for the e¢ cient quantity of output. In both cases, the buyer appropriates the whole surplus of the match.
Equation (17) determines a unique q h < q`. Given q h , d h is determined by (18) . The most noticeable feature of this solution is that q h < q`, which implies d h < A and q h < q . Buyers holding high-dividend assets only trade a fraction of their assets in the PM market even though their consumption is ine¢ ciently low. This illiquidity-the fact that they spend strictly less than they would in a complete information environment-is a consequence of the need for buyers in the high state to separate themselves from buyers in the low state.
Buyers' o¤ers are illustrated in the right panel of Figure I now turn to the normative properties of the equilibrium. If `A c(q )= , then the value of the low-dividend asset is large enough to trade the …rst-best quantity, q . Under complete information the economy achieves its …rst-best. In contrast, if the quality of the asset is private information, then the equilibrium allocation is ine¢ cient. The` type buyers consume q , but h type buyers consume q h < q . If `A < c(q )= , then the quantities traded in the PM are ine¢ ciently low in all matches, i.e., q h < q`< q . 21 2 1 One could also ask whether there exists an incentive-feasible trading mechanism that implements the …rst-best allocation in the absence of …at money. Consider a direct mechanism that maps the buyer's type into an o¤er (q; d). Suppose q h = q`= q . Then, incentive-compatibility requires d h = d`= d. So the outcome is pooling, in contrast to the outcome of our bargaining game. The trade (q ; d) satis…es the seller's individual rationality constraint if c(q ) + d 0. Similarly, buyers are willing to participate if u(q ) h d 0. Thus, the …rst-best is incentive-feasible provided that A c(q )= and h = u(q )=c(q ), i.e., there is no shortage of the asset and the discrepancy between the dividends in the di¤erent states is not too large.
In this section …at money is introduced as a competing means of payment. I ask whether …at money can acquire some positive value in exchange, and whether it helps mitigate the ine¢ ciencies associated with the adverse selection problem in the PM and the partial illiquidity of the real asset. I study how the rate of return of …at currency a¤ects asset liquidity and payment arrangements. Finally, the model will provide microfoundations, and closed-form expressions, for some of the trading restrictions found in the recent monetary literature.
I depart from the previous section by opening a competitive market in the AM where agents can trade …at money for goods. The dividend shocks, j;t , are independent and identically distributed across buyers, i.e., the measures of the subsets B h t and Bt are time-invariant. 22 The real asset, which is not homogenous, is only traded in bilateral meetings in the PM. (In the next section, the asset be traded in the AM market in order to investigate implications for asset prices.) One can think of the asset as private equity or bilateral credit (IOUs). 23 The sequence of events can be summarized as follows. First, for every buyer, Nature chooses the dividend size 2 f `; h g. A buyer learns the future dividend of his asset holdings before trading in the AM market.
Second, the buyer chooses his real balances as a function of his type. Third, he enters a bilateral match in the PM, and he makes an o¤er to an uninformed seller, who accepts or rejects it. From the seller's standpoint, the buyer j he is matched with has been chosen at random from the pool of all buyers, i.e., Pr j 2 B h t = h and Pr j 2 Bt = `. The buyer's portfolio is assumed to be non-observable by the seller in the match, and hence it cannot be used to condition the seller's acceptance decision (i.e., all histories with the same o¤er are part of the same information set). 24 Denote p t the price of the AM-good in period t. I focus on steady-state equilibria where aggregate real 2 2 We assume that there is no mechanism through which sellers can pool the risk associated with the random quality of the asset they receive in the PM. 2 3 Many assets, such as corporate bonds, private equity, derivatives and swaps, are traded in bilateral meetings, in over-thecounter markets. Ashcraft and Du¢ e (2007) argue that it is more sensible to describe the trading of assets of heterogenous quality (e.g., loans subject to credit risk) in over-the-counter markets. See Du¢ e, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005) for a formalization of such markets using a search model. A version of the model with IOUs would adopt a similar interpretation as in Jafarey and Rupert (2001) . Buyers receive an endowment A in the last period of their lives with probability 2 (0; 1) and nothing with the complement probability 1
. Hence, buyers default with probability 1 , and the expected value of a claim of d units of future output is d. For such credit arrangements to be feasible, one needs to assume that buyers are able to commit (but not sellers). 2 4 This assumption simpli…es the presentation by reducing the extent to which the buyer can signal his type. In Section 6 I consider a model with a di¤erent information structure where buyers'portfolios are common knowledge in the match. balances, M t =p t , are constant over time. Then, p t+1 =p t = .
A buyer makes two decisions consecutively: his real balances in the AM and the o¤er to make in the PM.
Hence, the strategy of a buyer is de…ned as a list (z; q; d; ) function of his type , where z is the choice of real balances (expressed in terms of the AM good of the current period), q is the buyer's consumption in the PM, d the transfer of the real asset, and the transfer of real balances. The optimal strategy maximizes the buyer's utility (excluding the lump-sum transfer, T ) subject to the seller's acceptance rule. It solves
The unspent real balances of the buyer generate a ‡ow of utility, (z )= , because consumption takes place in the next AM and real balances depreciate at rate . 25 Since buyers'real balances are not observable, the seller's updated belief, , only depends on the o¤er made by the buyer, (q; d; ).
Lemma 2 Any buyer's strategy, (z; q; d; ), such that z > , is strictly dominated.
Since it is costly to hold money-the gross in ‡ation rate is larger than the discount factor-and since real balances have no signaling function, it is a dominant strategy for a buyer to bring the exact amount he plans to spend in a bilateral match.
From Lemma 2, buyers'strategies can be restricted to triples (q; d; !), where ! z= = = indicates both the real balances of the buyer (discounted and expressed in terms of the next period's AM good) and the real money transfer in the PM to the seller. The buyer's problem, (19) - (20), can then be reduced to:
where (q; d; !) is the seller's posterior belief (with a slight abuse of notation), and i ( )= > 0 is the cost of holding real balances. 2 5 Suppose the buyer hands over mt units of money to the seller. These mt units of money buy mt=p t+1 units of AM goods in period t + 1 or, equivalently, (mt=pt)(pt=p t+1 ) = (mt=pt)= .
Using a similar argument to the one in Lemma 1, the next proposition establishes that the equilibrium is separating.
Lemma 3 In any equilibrium, there is no pooling o¤ er.
From Lemma 3, an` type buyer cannot do better than his complete-information payo¤, which solves
+ max(x; 0)) and q`solves
with a strict equality if !`> 0. So` type buyers accumulate real balances if the value of their real asset is not large enough to purchase q and if i is su¢ ciently small.
As in the previous section, the Intuitive Criterion selects the equilibrium that is Pareto e¢ cient (from the standpoint of buyers'interim payo¤s) in the class of separating equilibria. 26 Hence, the h type buyer makes an o¤er that maximizes his payo¤ subject to the seller's acceptance rule and the condition that the o¤er must not be imitated by` type buyers, i.e., (q h ; d h ; ! h ) solves
Lemma 4 There is a unique solution, (q h ; d h ; ! h ), to (24)- (26) and it solves:
and
Assuming ! h > 0, the problem of an h type buyer can be solved recursively. First, (29) determines q h .
Given q h , (27) and (28) determine ! h and d h . 27 The next proposition determines the conditions for …at money to be valued in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Existence of monetary equilibrium)
There exists i 1 0 and i 2 > i 1 , such that the following is true.
1. If i < i 1 , then there is a unique monetary equilibrium, and it is such that all buyers accumulate real balances. Furthermore,
, then there is a unique monetary equilibrium, and it is such that only h type buyers accumulate real balances.
3. If i i 2 , then there is no equilibrium where …at money is valued.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 3 . The condition for the existence of a monetary equilibrium in part 1 of Proposition 2 is identical to the one in the complete-information economy. Indeed, with complete information …at money is valued if and only if !`> 0 (since ! h < !`) or, equivalently,
where q`= min q ; c 1 ( `A ) . The condition (30) requires A to be small enough.
Part 2 of Proposition 2 is new. If i > i 1 , then there is no monetary equilibrium with complete information.
In contrast, if buyers have some private information, then a monetary equilibrium exists, provided that i is not greater than i 2 u 0 (q) c 0 (q) 1, whereq < q is the solution to (17) . The threshold i 2 is bounded away from zero, for any level of the stock of assets, A. In particular, if A c(q )= `, then U ( `) = u(q ) c(q ), so that bothq < q and i 2 > 0 are independent of A. So the private information problem enlarges the set of parameter values under which …at money is valued.
A distinctive feature of search-theoretic monetary models is their ability to endogenize payment arrangements in decentralized trades (e.g., Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989) . The next proposition describes the payment 2. dV h =d h < 0 and dV h =d `> 0.
3. dV`=d h = 0; dV`=d `< 0 if c(q ) < `A and V`= 1 otherwise.
As
According to part 1 of Proposition 3, the high-dividend asset is partially illiquid in the sense that buyers only spend a fraction of their assets, d h < A, even though their PM consumption is ine¢ ciently low, q h < q .
As a consequence of this illiquidity, h type buyers accumulate more real balances than` type buyers. By holding onto a fraction of his real asset, the buyer is able to signal its quality to the seller; he uses the liquid asset to …nance the rest of his consumption. 28 Notice that this payment pattern is signi…cantly di¤erent from the one that would prevail in the complete-information economy: h type buyers would accumulate fewer real balances and consume (weakly) more than` type buyers.
According to part 2, the velocity of the high-dividend asset increases with the size of the low-state dividend, `, and it decreases with h . To understand this result, notice from (26) that` type buyers enjoy an informational rent equal to ( h `) d h . As `g ets closer to h , this informational rent shrinks, and the incentive-compatibility constraint of the` type buyer is relaxed, which improves the liquidity of the asset in the high-dividend state. 29 Conversely, as h `i ncreases, the informational asymmetries become more severe, which makes the incentive-compatibiliy condition more binding. According to part 3, the velocity of the low-dividend asset decreases with `b ut it is una¤ected by h .
In the case where the dividend in the low state approaches 0 (part 4 of Proposition 3), the adverse selection problem is so severe that the real asset ceases to be traded. Fiat money becomes the only means of payment. 30 This result rationalizes cash-in-advance-like constraints.
In the case where i < i 1 , one can get the following closed-form expression for the velocity of the highdividend asset,
This expression makes a connection between this model and the approaches of Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) and Lagos (2006) . In Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) , agents can only sell a fraction 2 (0; 1) of their illiquid asset (capital) to raise funds; in Lagos (2006) , agents can use their illiquid asset ("Lucas'trees") in a fraction of of the matches. In both cases, the parameter is exogenous. 31 In my model, assuming i < i 1 , buyers spend all their capital in a fraction `o f the matches, and they spend a fraction
f their capital in the remaining h matches. The illiquidity of capital is endogenous: it depends on the intrinsic characteristics of the asset ( `a nd h ) as well as monetary policy (i). 2 9 This result is related to the …ndings in Banerjee and Maskin (1996), according to which the good that serves as the medium of exchange is the one for which the discrepancy between qualities is smallest.
3 0 Strictly speaking, the` type buyers use the real asset in payments (d`= A) but because `! 0 the amount of output they buy with it approaches 0. This result is related to the threat of counterfeiting in Nosal and Wallace (2007) . 3 1 If one assumes the same trading restriction as in Kiyotaki-Moore, i.e., agents can only a fraction of their real asset holdings to …nance their consumption opportunities, in a version of the model with homogenous assets ( h = `= ) then q = q i¤ A c(q )= in which case …at money is not valued and the velocity of capital is V = c(q )= A. If A < c(q )= then V = . If one assume the same restriction as in Lagos, i.e., agents can use their real asset holdings as means of payment in a fraction of the matches, then the following is true. If A c(q )= then q = q in a fraction of the trades and
In the case where i 2 (i 1 ; i 2 ) then, from (28) , asset velocity satis…es
where q`= min c 1 ( `A ); q . The fraction of the real asset that is used as means of payment is still a function of the dividend process and in ‡ation, but it is no longer independent of the stock of the asset: it decreases with A provided that A is su¢ ciently large.
The next Proposition investigates the e¤ects of monetary policy on payment arrangements and liquidity.
Proposition 4 (Monetary policy and liquidity)
2. In addition, if i < i 1 then d!`=di < 0.
3. As i ! 0, V h ! 0 and q ! q in all trades.
In ‡ation lowers the rate of return of …at money, and hence it induces buyers to reduce their real balances.
While the liquidity of the low-dividend asset is independent of monetary policy, in ‡ation raises the velocity of the high-dividend asset. Since ! h > !`an increase in i makes it less attractive for an` type buyer to imitate an h type buyer. For instance, in the case where i < i 1 , the incentive-compatibility condition (26) at equality yields
). An increase in i relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint allowing the h type buyer to transfer a larger quantity of his real asset in the PM.
As the cost of holding money is driven to 0, the equilibrium allocation approaches the …rst best. 32 The optimal monetary policy is such that the high-dividend asset is illiquid, i.e., h type buyers trade with money only. Moreover, if `A > c(q ) then` type buyers do not accumulate real balances. So, buyers specialize in di¤erent means of payment according to their types. 33 
Asset pricing and liquidity
This section investigates the implications of the model for asset prices. I analyze the relationship between assets intrinsic characteristics, liquidity, and returns. The model also provides a channel through which 3 2 Recall that even if the Friedman rule is optimal, it might not be incentive-feasible if the government has limited coercion power. See footnote 10. 3 3 While …at money and the real asset coexist as means of payment in equilibrium for all i > 0, there is an equilibrium at i = 0 where d`= 0 and !`= c(q ) so that only money is used. To see this, notice from (22) that at i = 0 the choices of ! and d are perfect substitutes for` type buyers: they only care about the total expected resources they give up, `d + !. Hence, the equilibrium allocation is only upper-hemi continuous at i = 0. monetary policy a¤ects asset prices.
The model is amended as follows. The real asset is described as a short-lived homogenous "Lucas tree" subject to an aggregate dividend shock. All capital goods yield a high dividend (i.e., j;t = h for all j) with probability h , and a low dividend (i.e., j;t = `f or all j) with complement probability `. Both …at money and capital are traded in a competitive market in the AM. 34 This extension allows the real asset to be priced. In order to prevent the asset price from revealing buyers'private information, it is assumed that buyers learn the future dividend of the real asset when they enter the PM, after they chose their portfolios.
Finally, to simplify the analysis of the bargaining game, a buyer's portfolio is common knowledge in a match in the PM. 35 The sequence of events is as follows. First, newborn buyers make a portfolio choice in the AM market.
Second, they receive a private and fully informative signal about the future dividend of the real asset. Then, they enter the PM and get matched with sellers. An implication of this timing is that the buyer's portfolio does not convey any information about . Upon entering the bargaining game, and irrespective of the buyer's portfolio he observes, the seller assigns probability h to the event = h and probability `t o the event
Once the buyer has made his o¤er (q; d; ), the seller updates his initial belief. Let (q; d; ; !; a)
denote the seller's belief that = h conditional on the o¤er (q; d; ) being made. The seller's posterior belief, , is also a function of the buyer's portfolio (which is known to the seller). In the following, this dependence will be left implicit.
The strategy of a buyer is composed of a portfolio choice (!; a) in the AM and an o¤er (q; d; ) in the PM contingent on the history (!; a; ). The buyer's o¤er solves:
[q(!; a; ); d(!; a; ); (!; a; )] = arg max
Let de…ne the buyer's surplus in the PM as S j (!; a) u(q) j d = for j 2 f`; hg where (q; d; ) is a solution to (33)-(35) when the buyer's state is (!; a; j ).
In the AM, buyers choose their portfolios in order to maximize their expected surplus in the PM net of the cost of holding real balances and capital, i.e.,
where i = ( )= is the cost of holding real balances, and is the cost of investing in capital, the di¤erence between its price and its expected discounted dividend. Since sellers cannot produce in the AM, only buyers hold some capital and market-clearing implies 
If = h then the equilibrium terms of trade (q h ; d h ; h ) solve
!; d a:
The equilibrium of the bargaining game is separating. In the low-dividend state, buyers make their complete information o¤er, i.e., q`= min q ; c 1 ( `a + !) and
The buyers'surplus in this case is S`(!; a) =Ŝ (! + `a ), which only depends on their total wealth. In the high-dividend state, buyers choose the separating o¤er that maximizes their surplus. Pooling o¤ers are ruled-out by a reasoning analogous to the one in the previous sections: if there were a pooling o¤er then buyers could deviate in the high-dividend state and signal the true state of the world by demanding less output and o¤ering less capital.
Lemma 6 For any (!; a) 2 R 2 + , there is a unique solution (q h ; d h ; h ) to (41)- (44) and it is such that (42) and (43) hold at equality.
If ! c(q ) then
2. If ! < c(q ) then h = != and (q h ; d h ) 2 [0; q`] [0; a] is solution to:
where q`= min q ; c 1 (! + `a ) . Moreover, if a > 0 then q h < q`and d h < a.
Lemma 6 o¤ers a pecking order theory of payment choices: agents with a consumption opportunity …nance it with cash …rst, and they use their risky assets as a last resort. 36 They choose not to spend all their capital goods, even when q h is ine¢ ciently low, in order to signal the high future dividend of the real asset.
From (48) and (49), the fraction h d h =a of his capital that a buyer spends in the PM is a function of his portfolio, (!; a), as well as the characteristics of the dividend process, ( `; h ). For instance, h decreases with ! and h , but it increases with `. The fact that h is a¤ected by real balances o¤ers a channel through which monetary policy a¤ects the liquidity of the real asset. At the margin, the fraction of capital that is used as means of payment is
If a > c(q )= `t hen q`= q and dd h =da = 0. A marginal unit of capital has no direct liquidity value in the high-dividend state; it in ‡uences the terms of trade only indirectly, through the surplus of the buyer in the low-dividend state, by relaxing the incentive-compatibility constraint. But if a > c(q )= `t hen the liquidity needs in the low-dividend state are satiated, and hence an additional unit of capital does not a¤ect the terms of trade in the high-dividend state.
Let S ! and S a denote the partial derivatives of the surplus function S (!; a) for 2 f`; hg. These quantities represent the liquidity values of …at money and capital in the state . It is shown in the Appendix A (proof of Lemma 7) that
A marginal unit of asset (expressed in terms of its discounted value in the next AM market) allows the buyer to purchase 1=c 0 (q`) units of PM output, which is valued according to the marginal surplus of the match, u 0 (q`) c 0 (q`). In the high-dividend state,
where
Consider a buyer who accumulates an additional unit of capital. How does this marginal unit impact on his surplus in the PM in the high-dividend state? Provided that q`< q , an additional unit of capital raises the surplus of the buyer in the low-dividend state by Sà, and hence it relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint (43 
which gives (53).
It can be seen from (51) and (53) that S h a < Sà (unless q`= q ) so that the capital stock has a lower liquidity value in the high-dividend state. Moreover, from (52)- (53),
So, the expected liquidity value of capital, expressed as a fraction of its fundamental price, is less than the liquidity value of …at currency. This observation will be useful in the following to explain the rate of return di¤erential between assets.
Given the solution to the bargaining problem in the PM, I proceed backward and solve the buyer's portfolio problem in the AM.
Lemma 7
If > then there is a unique solution to (36) and it satis…es
If = then ! is uniquely determined by (54) and a 2 [
1). If < then there is no solution to (36).
If the price of capital is greater than its fundamental value, i.e., > 0, then the composition of the buyer's optimal portfolio is unique. This result is a consequence of Lemma 6 according to which …at money is a preferred means of payment, i.e., the two assets are not perfect substitutes. If the price of capital coincides with its fundamental value, = , then buyers hold enough wealth to buy the …rst-best quantity of output when = `a nd the buyer's choice of capital is indeterminate. In contrast, the choice of real balances is always unique.
The next proposition proves existence of the equilibrium and it characterizes the allocations.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium allocations and prices)
An equilibrium exists and it is such that the price of capital, From (51), (53) and (55), the equilibrium price of capital satis…es
The second term on the right-hand side of (56) is the liquidity component of the asset price. It is positive if and only if q`< q and `> 0. If q`= q then buyers have enough wealth to buy q in the low-dividend state so that a marginal unit of capital is not useful as a means of payment. If `! 0 then capital has no value in the low-dividend state, and hence it does not provide liquidity in the PM. From (54), the liquidity value of …at money is equal to i which, from (51)-(53), satis…es
According to the right-hand side of (57) …at money provides some liquidity services whenever q`< q or
A monetary equilibrium exists for all A provided that the cost of holding real balances, i, is su¢ ciently low. This result contrasts with the complete-information economy where the equilibrium is monetary only if the capital stock is not large enough to allow buyers to trade q when = `( See Appendix E). Money is useful, even for large values of A, because it overcomes the illiquidity of capital in the high-dividend state,
i.e., it relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint faced by buyers. Consequently, the set of parameter values under which ! > 0 is larger in the economy with private information (see Figure 4 ).
The next proposition describes the e¤ects of monetary policy on the liquidity and expected return of the real asset. The liquidity of capital is measured by its transaction velocity, and its liquidity premium is de…ned by L = ( ) = . 37 The expected return of capital is R a = = .
Proposition 6 (Monetary policy, liquidity, and returns.)
(b) For all A < A(i), L > 0 and R a < 1 . Moreover, if i < i 0 (A) then dL=di > 0 and dR a =di < 0.
As
The price of capital can depart from its fundamental value and exhibit a liquidity premium. This liquidity component emerges if capital is relatively scarce, i.e., A < c(q )= `, and in ‡ation is su¢ ciently large, i > A 1 (A). On the contrary, if in ‡ation is too low then the liquidity needs in the low-dividend state are exhausted. 38 An obvious requirement for monetary policy to be e¤ective is that …at money is valued, which necessitates that in ‡ation is not too large, i < i 0 (A).
An increase in the in ‡ation rate raises the price of capital, and its liquidity premium, through a substitution e¤ect that induces buyers to hold fewer real balances but more capital. Since capital is in …xed supply, its price goes up and the fraction of capital that is used as means of payment in the high-dividend state (V h ) increases. As a corollary of these …ndings, the model predicts a negative relationship between in ‡ation and expected asset returns. 39 If capital is su¢ ciently abundant to allow buyers to consume q in the low-dividend state then the price of capital is equal to its fundamental value-which is independent of monetary policy-and its expected rate of return is equal to the gross discount rate. The optimal policy drives the cost of holding money to 0, and it exhausts the liquidity of the real asset. As i tends to zero then q`and q h approach q . 40 In the high-dividend state, buyers trade with money only (d h ! 0) while in the low-dividend state buyers are indi¤erent between using money or capital as means of payment. The price of capital converges to its fundamental value ( ! ).
Next, I look at the implications of the model for the rates of return of …at money (R m = 1 ) and capital (R a = = ).
Proposition 7 (Rate of return dominance)
In any monetary equilibrium, R a > R m .
The expected rate of return of capital is always greater than the rate of return of …at money (provided that it is valued). So, the model generates a rate-of-return di¤erential between the two assets without resorting to restrictions on payment arrangements. This rate-of-return di¤erential is not an obvious consequence of the di¤erence of risks associated with each asset. Indeed, because of linear preferences with respect to AM consumption, the riskiness of capital would not a¤ect its rate of return if it were not used as a means of payment in the PM. For instance, if A is su¢ ciently abundant then capital has no liquidity value at the margin and R a = 1 , independently of the dividend process. Risk matters here because, in the presence of private information, it a¤ects the liquidity value of capital relative to the one of …at money.
As showed in the Appendix E, such rate-of-return dominance pattern can also emerge from an economy with complete information. The private information problem, however, reduces the liquidity premium that accrues to the real asset, and it increases the rate of return di¤erential between …at money and risky capital.
In particular, the liquidity premium of capital, ( )= , is bounded above by `i = , which tends to zero as the dividend in the low state becomes small. Moreover, provided that the capital stock is su¢ ciently large (A > A(i)), the rate of return of capital is maximum and equal to the gross discount rate, R a = 1 . In this case, an additional unit of capital has no liquidity value in the PM. 41 The rate of return di¤erential between risk-free …at money and risky capital depends on the relative liquidity of both assets, which in turn depends on their intrinsic characteristics, such as their rate of return and risk. I end this section by illustrating this point through a simple numerical example. I adopt the following speci…cations: u(q) = 2 p q, c(q) = q, = 0:95, `= 1 , h = 1 + , h = `= 0:5 and A = 1.
The mean of the dividend is equal to 1 while its variance is 2 . I consider the e¤ects of a change in on the velocity of the asset and its liquidity premium.
Figure 5: Asset liquidity
The left panel of Figure 5 represents the velocity of the asset in the high state,
in the low state the payment can be indeterminate.) As increases, the fraction of the asset that is used as means of payment in the high-dividend state decreases. As approaches one, the real asset becomes fully illiquid.
The right panel of Figure 5 plots the liquidity premium de…ned as = 1 R a . Recall that the rate of return of …at money is constant and equal to 1 . Hence, as the liquidity premium decreases the rate-ofreturn di¤erential increases. The relationship between the liquidity premium and risk is nonmonotonic. An increase in makes the asset more illiquid in the high-dividend state so that the liquidity premium should fall. But the decrease in `m akes liquidity more valuable in the low-dividend state. As is su¢ ciently large, the liquidity premium decreases with risk, and it tends to 0 as approaches one. So, the rate-of-return di¤erential is maximum provided that the real asset is su¢ ciently risky.
I have formalized economies where …at money coexists and competes with a one-period lived real asset as means of payment. I complied with the Wallace (1996) dictum by placing no restrictions on the use of assets as media of exchange. The usefulness of …at money in the model arises from a private information problem about the fundamental value of the real asset. Some agents are informed about the future dividend of the real asset while others are uninformed. These informational asymmetries make the real asset partially illiquid thereby providing microfoundations for some of the trading restrictions, or liquidity constraints, found in the recent monetary literature. I have investigated the relationship between asset liquidity and fundamentals, the implications for asset pricing, and the links between monetary policy, liquidity and asset returns.
In terms of extensions, one could investigate the e¤ect of liquidity on capital formation by letting the real asset be produced in the AM (as in Lagos and Rocheteau (2006)). The dividend shocks can be made persistent to study liquidity and asset prices over the cycle. For some questions (e.g., endogenous information acquisition) it might also be desirable to endow sellers with some market power (e.g., through competitive price posting). Finally, it would certainly be worthwhile to calibrate a version of the model in order to see how well it does to explain some asset pricing puzzles, as in Lagos (2006) 
A. Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Lemma 1.
Suppose there is an equilibrium o¤er such that ( q; d) 2 (0; 1). Hence,
The payo¤ of an` type buyer is bounded below by his complete information payo¤, i.e.,
Since `> 0, U b > 0 and hence q > 0. Furthermore, ( q; d) is accepted by sellers if
To show that the proposed equilibrium violates the Intuitive Criterion, consider an out-of-equilibrium o¤er (q;d) such thatd = d ", where " 2 0; d c( q)= h , andq < q satis…es (9)- (10) or, equivalently,
Since Proof of Proposition 1. The allocation in` type matches, (15) and (16), is derived directly from (12) . The rest of the proof focuses on the allocation in h type matches. It proceeds in three parts. First, I establish that both the seller's participation constraint and the incentive-compatibility condition (14) are binding. Second, it is shown that the solution to (13)- (14) is unique and it is such that d h < d`and q h < q`.
Third, I specify a belief system consistent with these o¤ers.
(i) The set of admissible values for (q; d) being compact (closed and bounded) and the buyer's objective function being continuous, a solution to (13)- (14) exists. It is straightforward to check that this solution cannot be such that neither the seller's participation constraint nor (14) bind. Suppose …rst that the seller's participation constraint binds while (14) is slack. Then, q h = min c 1 ( h A);`= min c 1 ( `A ); q (from (15)) and d h = c(q h )= h . Thus,
and (14) is violated. A contradiction.
Suppose next that (14) binds while the seller's participation constraint is slack. Substitute u(q h ) by its expression given by (14) into the h buyer's objective function to get
Consequently, the solution to (13)- (14) is such that both the seller's participation constraint and (14) bind. Substitute d h = c(q h )= h into (14) to get (17)- (18).
(ii) Equation (17) can be rewritten as:
The term between brackets on the right-hand side of (59) is strictly decreasing from U ( `) to 0 as q h varies from 0 to q` q , while the left-hand side of (59) is strictly increasing from 0 to c(q`) as q h varies from 0 to q`. Hence, there is a unique q h 2 (0; q`) that solves (59) and it is the unique solution to (13)- (14) . To see this, from (17),
Hence, the solution to (17) corresponding to the lowest value for q h is the one that maximizes the h type buyer's payo¤, u(q h ) c(q h ).
Finally, from the fact that h buyers prefer weakly (q h ; d h ) to (q`; d`) and` buyers prefer weakly (q`; d`)
Since
(iii) A belief system consistent with the o¤ers (q`; d`) and (q h ; d h ) is as follows. Bayes' rule requires
For all other (out-of-equilibrium) o¤ers,
One can verify that (q`; d`) and (q h ; d h ) are solutions to (8) given (q; d). Any o¤er such that u(q)
is assigned to an` type buyer and it is such that c(q) + `d < 0 (by de…nition of U ( `) ). Hence it is rejected by sellers. Consequently, U ( `) is the highest payo¤ attainable by an` type buyer. Similarly, the solution to (13)- (14) is also the solution to (8) since any o¤er that violates (14) is rejected by sellers and any o¤er that satis…es (14) , except (q`; d`), is attributed to an h type buyer. 
Proof of
for any A (since < z). Hence, s is strictly dominated.
Proof of Lemma 3.
A proposed equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion if there is an unsent o¤er (q;d;!) that satis…es:
where U 
This o¤er satis…es the seller's participation constraint, i.e.,
In order to prove that the proposed equilibrium violates the Intuitive Criterion, consider an out-of-
, and it satis…es (61)-(62) or, equivalently,
Since ( Finally, to show that there is no pooling o¤er with d = 0 it is enough to notice that
is less than U ( `) , the complete-information payo¤ of the` type buyer de…ned in (22) .
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof proceeds in two parts. First, it establishes that the constraints (25) and (26) are binding. Second, it proves that the solution to (24)- (26) exists and is unique.
(i) The constraints (25) and (26) are binding.
It is straightforward to show that the solution to (24)- (26) cannot be such that neither (25) nor (26) bind. Assume that the seller's participation constraint binds while (26) is slack. Then,
with an equality if ! h > 0. From the comparison with (22) , it can be checked that q h q`and ! h !ẁ ith at least one strict inequality. Hence,
Since c(q h ) = h d h + ! h the previous inequality gives
So (26) is violated. A contradiction.
Assume next that (25) is slack while (26) binds. Substitute ! h by its expression given by (26) into the h buyer's objective function to get
can then be rewritten as
Since d`> 0, it can be checked from (22) that
. Hence, there is no q h that satis…es the constraint above.
Consequently, the solution to (24)- (26) is such that both (25) and (26) bind.
(ii) The solution to (24)- (26) exists and is unique.
Assume ! h > 0. One can solve for ! h and d h from (25) and (26) and get (27)- (28) . Substitute ! h and d h by their expressions given by (27) and (28) into (24) and di¤erentiate with respect to q h to show that q h =q whereq is the unique solution to
Given q h , (d h ; ! h ) is uniquely determined by (27) - (28) . From (27) the condition ! h > 0 can be reexpressed
If (66) does not hold then ! h = 0. From Proposition 1, q h =q 2 (0; q`) is the unique solution to (17) and (27)- (28) with ! h = 0. The condition (66) is violated ifor,
Proof of Proposition 2.
From Lemma 4 and Eq.(22) the terms of trade (q`; d`; !`) and (q h ; d h ; ! h ) are uniquely determined.
Therefore, up to the seller's belief system, the equilibrium is unique. The rest of the proof proceeds in two steps.
(a) Condition under which !`> 0.
First, ! h > 0 when i < i 1 . Indeed, if ! h = 0 then q h < q`(from (17) and Proposition 1). Since So in any monetary equilibrium ! h > 0 and, from (29) ,
and hence q h q`with an equality if !`> 0.
Next, I prove ! h > !`. This is immediate if !`= 0 (since ! h > 0 in any monetary equilibrium). Consider the case !`> 0. The incentive-compatibility condition for the` type buyer is
Since c(q
Since q h = q`when !`> 0, (67) becomes (28) and the fact that
(ii) If i i 2 then ! h = 0. From the proof of Proposition 1, q h is the unique solution less than q`to (59).
Di¤erentiate (59) to get:
and hence dV h =d h < 0.
From (18), dV h =d `> 0.
where I have used (28) and the fact that q h = q`and
(iv) From the proof of Proposition 2, i 1 ! 1 as `! 0. Hence, there always exists a monetary (23) and (29), both q h = c 1 (! h ) and q`= c 1 (!`)
Proof of Proposition 4. Two cases are distinguished.
(a) !`> 0. From (23), dq`=di < 0 and, using the fact that !`= c(q`)
Di¤erentiate the equation above to obtain
where I used the fact that ! h = c(q h ) h d h and, from (22) 
(b) !`= 0. Then, q`is independent of i and dU ( `) =di = 0. Di¤erentiating (28),
The rest of the proof is analogous to (a).
Finally, from (29) 
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider the bargaining game between a buyer who has made the portfolio choice (!; a) in the AM and a seller. Recall that the portfolio choice is common knowledge in the match. The outcome of (33)-(34) cannot be pooling (or semi-pooling). Since the argument is analogous to the one in the proof of Lemma 3, I only review it succinctly.
Suppose that the equilibrium of the bargaining game admits a pooling o¤er ( q; d; ). By de…nition,
This equilibrium fails the Intuitive
Criterion if there exists an unsent o¤er (q;d;~ ) that it is feasible, ~ = ! andd a, and such that
Then, one can construct an alternative o¤er (q;d;~ ) with the following properties:
First, such an o¤er exists since c( q) + h d + = > 0 (i.e., the pooling o¤er ( q; d; ) is acceptable). (41)- (44) . If a = 0 it can easily be checked that (q h ; h ) = (q`; `) . So, in the following I focus on the case where a > 0.
First, suppose that the incentive-compatibility condition (43) is slack. Then, q h = min q ; c
Consequently, if ! < c(q ) then (43) is violated, which is a contradiction. If ! c(q ) then q h = q and the inequality above implies d h = 0 and h = = c(q ).
Second, suppose that the seller's participation constraint (42) is slack. Substitute u(q h ) by its expression given by (43) into the objective function of the h buyer to get
and d h = 0. The h buyer gets the same surplus as a` buyer, i.e.,
where I have used that d h = 0 in the maximization problem on the right-hand side of the equality. The equality holds if and only if ! c(q ). In that case, q h = q and h = = c(q ), which is consistent with the …rst case.
Third, suppose ! < c(q ) so that both the seller's participation constraint and the incentive-compatibility condition (43) are binding. Since (42) is binding, d h is given by (48) . Substitute d h by its expression into (43) at equality to get (49) . For all q h 2 [0; q`] the left-hand side of (49) is strictly increasing. It is nonpositive at q h = 0 and greater than u(q`) c(q`) at q h = q`provided that c(q`) > !. is a unique q h 2 (0; q`) solution to (49) . It can be checked that u(q h ) c(q h ) is decreasing in q h for any solution to (49) . (See Proposition 1 for a related argument.) Hence, the unique solution in (0; q`) delivers a maximum to the problem (41)- (44) . Given a unique q h , d h is determined by (48) . Finally,
Proof of Lemma 7. Equations (54) and (55) are the …rst-order conditions with respect to ! and a of the problem (36) . The following cases are distinguished: > , = and < .
(i) > .
First, compute the …rst and second partial derivatives and the cross-partial derivatives of the functions S`(!; a) and S h (!; a) where ! = z= . These expressions will be used to prove that the objective function in (36) is strictly concave with respect to (!; a) over some relevant range.
From Lemma 5, (q`; d`; `) solves (38)- (39) and S`(!; a) =Ŝ(! + `a ) = u(q`) c(q`) where q`= min q ; c
whereŜ` Ŝ (! + `a ). From Lemma 6, if ! < c(q ) then q h solves (49) . Totally di¤erentiating (49),
where I have used the fact that u(q`) c(q`) =Ŝ(! + `a ). Notice that dq h d! > 0 for all ! < c(q ) and dq h da > 0 for all (!; a) such that ! + `a < c(q ). From Lemma 6, the seller's participation constraint (42) holds at equality so that S h (!; a) = u(q h ) c(q h ). Hence, Since S`(!; a) =Ŝ(! + `a ), 1 = 0. After some calculation,
dq h da where and 0 are evaluated at q = q h . Therefore,
Hence, jHj > 0 for all ! + `a < c(q ).
One can now show that there is a unique solution to (36) . First, the solution to (36) is such that ! + `a c(q ). Suppose ! + `a > c(q ). Then,Ŝ 0 = 0 and S The …rst-order condition for !, (54), implies then ! = 0. A contradiction. So one can restrict (!; a) to the compact set f(!; a) 2 R 2+ : ! + `a c(q )g and, from the Theorem of the Maximum, a solution to (36) exists and it satis…es the …rst-order conditions (54)-(55). Since H is negative de…nite for all (!; a) such that ! + `a < c(q ), i.e., the leading principal minors of H alternate in sign with the …rst one being negative, the solution to (36) is unique.
(ii) = .
From the …rst-order condition for a, (55), S 
Similarly, from (54), and after replacing S h ! and S! by their expressions,
Using the fact that 1 + i = = , the equation above can be rewritten as
From (73) and (74),
From (54), (q h ) > 0 (since S h ! > 0) for all i > 0. Moreover, `< < h . Hence, R a > R m :
